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Postcolonial Cosmopolitanism: making place for nationalism 
 
Rahul Rao 
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This paper presents, in a condensed form, some of the key arguments of my new book Third 
World Protest: Between Home and the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 




Abstract: This paper takes as its point of departure, the debate between cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism in international normative theory. It expresses a number of dissatisfactions 
with this debate, criticising its inattention to politics and history, its Eurocentrism, and the 
simplistic imageries of threat on which attitudes towards boundaries in this debate are 
premised. It attempts to remedy these problems by recasting the figure of the subaltern that 
haunts this debate—hitherto imagined as a passive recipient of Northern/Western largesse—
as an active agent struggling for emancipation, and contrasts the potentials of 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism to function as vocabularies in which such struggle 
might be articulated. In addition, by thinking about cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, 
not merely as ethical doctrines about justice, but also as political worldviews crafted in 
particular historical and material contexts, it demonstrates the ambiguous appeal of both 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism from the point of view of the subaltern. The paper 
then turns to the writings of four postcolonial thinkers who refuse the conventional 
opposition between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism (James Joyce, Rabindranath 
Tagore, Edward Said and Frantz Fanon). Rather than resolving the 
cosmopolitan/communitarian impasse, it argues that the tension between communitarian 
essentialism and cosmopolitan deconstruction that characterizes their work constitutes a 
protest sensibility that is better suited to the exigencies of subaltern struggle in the 






The literature of international normative theory has been the site of a vigorous debate 
between those who insist that the scope of justice ought to be universal, and a variety of 
positions that defend limits on the scope of justice. Exponents of the first view—whom we 
might call ‗cosmopolitans‘—weigh equally the claims of all individuals who would be 
affected by policies or institutional arrangements, out of a belief in the equal worth of 
humanity in all persons regardless of their membership of particular communities.
1
 Critics of 
cosmopolitan thinking are too diverse to classify under a single rubric. One influential 
subset—whom we might label ‗communitarians‘—argue that norms of justice can only arise 
from within bounded communities. In their view, the content of community—its norms, 
values, traditions—is in some way constitutive of a sense of justice.
2
 In some versions of this 
thesis, the nation is seen as the politically most salient form of community for this purpose.
3
 
One important consequence of regarding communities as sources of ethical value in their own 
right and boundaries as having ethical significance, is that it becomes permissible (and in 
some versions of the thesis, obligatory) to ascribe priority to members of the community over 
non-members in certain contexts. Communitarians sometimes claim, additionally, that the 
universal obligations posited by cosmopolitans are motivationally over-demanding and 
therefore psychologically infeasible. This is because, in their view, moral motivation is 
strongly linked to identity and community is constitutive of identity, the upshot of which is 
that people are thought to lack the motivation to discharge obligations owed to those with 
whom they do not identify.   
The different voices in this debate are essentially addressing the question of what obligations 
we owe others, or perhaps more accurately what obligations are owed to which others. This 
discourse of political obligation becomes particularly vexed in the context of global problems 
of serious magnitude such as genocide, poverty and climate change, where the ‗others‘ in 
question are often distant others whom we neither know nor see, and with whom we may 
share few of the ties of race, religion, ethnicity or language that appear to bind us to our 
fellow nationals. While these issues are of undeniable political, and indeed existential, 
urgency, they have spawned a rather arid academic debate that is problematic in a number of 
respects.  
First, a great deal of the work that constitutes the field of international normative theory is 
concerned very largely with elaborating a normative framework that will usher in a more just 
and humane world. This endeavour focuses mainly on the content of norms, while remaining 
insufficiently attentive to the political mechanisms by which norms are enforced or 
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undermined, or the history of ideas and practices associated with such norms. Yet politics is 
inescapable, as Fred Dallmayr reminds us, because norms do not translate directly into praxis 
but require careful interpretation and application, both of which raise eminently political 
questions (who has the right of interpretation?; and in case of conflict, who is entitled to 
adjudicate between different interpretations?).
4
 And history is crucial because the legitimacy 
of norms may be shaped by readings of their provenance and praxis in the world (where have 
they come from?; what have they done?).
5
 
Second, although the charge of Eurocentrism has been levelled against Western political 
theory for some time, it does not seem to have had very much impact in the field of what 
passes as ‗international‘ normative theory.
6
 This field is ‗international‘ in its aspirations, in 
the sense that it is concerned with the ethics of world ordering. Yet it is dominated by Euro-
American theorists (or theorists working in Euro-American universities), and its theoretical 
production makes very little reference to the politics and self-understandings of subjects in 
the non-Western world. The implications of this might be more obvious if we were to 
consider attitudes towards nationalism, as a case in point. The cosmopolitan literature‘s 
antipathy towards nationalism is no doubt shaped by the Western experience of nationalism, 
in which a discourse that begins as a struggle to democratise absolutist states, ends up being 
yoked to those states in projects of imperialism and fascism. There is little cognisance in this 
literature of the postcolonial attachment to nationalism, which, despite the subsequent 
depredations of postcolonial nation-states, continues to see nationalism as the vehicle that 
delivered the very condition of Latin American, African and Asian postcoloniality.
7
 The 
relative novelty and fragility of this transition in many parts of the world only reinforces the 
intensity of this attachment.  
This inattention to the history and politics of attitudes towards norms in the non-Western 
world may simply be a reflection of the more general inattention to history and politics 
described above. That general inattention in turn may stem from the methodological 
assumption that the content of justice can be known in its entirety by engaging in thought 
experiments, such as the imagination of what it would be rational for reasonable individuals 
to conclude as being in their interest, were they to operate behind a veil of ignorance that 
denied them knowledge of their citizenship and nationality (among other indications of their 
station in life). The Rawlsian original position is a device that claims to arrive at universal 
norms of justice, precisely by abstracting from particular experience. Yet Rawlsian norms 
themselves end up being contingent on empirical claims, some of which are highly contested. 
One thinks here of Rawls‘s justification in The Law of Peoples of a rather meagre level of 
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assistance to what he calls ‗burdened societies‘, based on the empirical claim—derived from 
Amartya Sen‘s work on famines—that domestic political culture rather than, say, external 
vulnerabilities are a more powerful determinant of aggregate levels of well-being.
8
 Even ideal 
theorising of the Rawlsian variety, then, cannot ultimately avoid an engagement with 
contentious questions of history and political economy. In addition, as I have recently argued 
elsewhere, the Rawlsian choosing procedure cannot claim to be universalistic even on its own 
terms unless the contracting parties in the original position operated, not only under a veil of 
ignorance insofar as their interests were concerned, but with substantial empirical knowledge 
of subaltern lives that might inform their conclusions about what it would be rational to 
desire if they were ever to find themselves in the position of the subaltern.
9
 Yet, by and large, 
the Rawlsian-inspired global justice literature makes little reference to the empirical 
actualities and normative worldviews of subaltern others.   
In this paper, I hope to make a tentative beginning towards addressing some of these deficits 
in what I consider to be an otherwise valuable literature. In particular, I want to reflect on the 
potentials of cosmopolitanism, and more particularly on the putative opposition between 
cosmopolitanism and nationalism, from a subaltern postcolonial perspective. I use the term 
‗subaltern‘ in the highly inexact but nonetheless useful sense suggested by the historian 
Ranajit Guha, who uses the category to refer to all non-elite ‗classes and groups constituting 
the mass of the labouring population and the intermediate strata in town and country.‘
10
 In 
postcolonial studies, the term is usually interpreted broadly to include any person or group of 
inferior rank (literally, ‗below the alter‘) whether because of class, race, gender, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity or any other identity.
11
 A ‗postcolonial perspective‘, following Robert 
Young, does not commit me to a particular theoretical approach but instead identifies a 
dialectical predisposition that takes into account both the broad historical facts of 
decolonisation and the determined achievement of sovereignty, but also the realities of 
nations and peoples emerging into new contexts of domination.
12
 
The adoption of this vantage point almost immediately casts the central preoccupations of the 
field of international normative theory in a somewhat exotic and elitist light. Debates between 
cosmopolitans and nationalists typically focus on the question ‗what obligations do we owe 
strangers?‘ But the question betrays a rather elitist conception of its audience. Anyone 
teetering on the brink of existence, on account of material deprivation or persecution by state 
or non-state actors for example, might be forgiven for not giving the question of their 
obligations to strangers much consideration. Philosophically, the universal relevance of the 
question is undeniable, for even those most marginalised in some contexts will occupy 
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positions of power in others, in which capacity they might be well-placed to harm the 
strangers in their midst. But politically, the question fails as an opening gambit insofar as its 
intention is to initiate a global conversation on justice. To ask what obligations one owes 
strangers seems to presuppose an audience that can afford the luxury of thinking about 
strangers. The political economy of the field of academic cosmopolitanism means that the 
question is usually posed by Western authors to largely satisfied Western audiences, with a 
view to persuading those audiences to treat outsiders with respect. But what of the subaltern 
outsiders? Can they be expected to be cosmopolitan too?  
This is a problem that should be of particular concern to cosmopolitans, given their 
commitment to universality. Leading cosmopolitan thinkers argue that cosmopolitanism is 
distinguished by its individuality, universality and generality, which is to say that all 
individuals are ultimate units of concern, equally, for everyone.
13
 This means that it should be 
possible for everyone to espouse a cosmopolitan worldview. Yet the preoccupations of 
subaltern outsiders are likely to be rather different from those of satisfied insiders. Rather 
than asking ‗what do we owe them?‘, a more pressing question from their point of view 
might be ‗what‘s in it for us?‘ What indeed might we find in cosmopolitanism for the 
subaltern?  
At first glance, rather a lot. Cosmopolitanism‘s promise of universal inclusion appears 
obviously appealing from a subaltern point of view.
14
 Yet this appeal should be tentative and 
prima facie because universalism by itself is a rather empty concept, offering little reason for 
celebration unless we endorse the ethical content of whatever is being universalised and the 
political means by which it is to be made universal. Admission into a universal polity is not 
straightforwardly liberating unless the terms of inclusion have specific emancipatory content. 
Perhaps it is cosmopolitanism‘s egalitarianism—its promise to weigh equally the claims of 
every person who would be affected by the choice of particular policies or institutional 
arrangements and the radical distributive implications of this maxim
15
—that seems more 
compelling from a subaltern perspective. Conversely, the communitarian claim that it is 
permissible or necessary to give ethical priority to one‘s compatriots appears to be a 
profoundly selfish one—given the gross inequalities that exist between political communities 
in the world today.
16
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To leave the argument here would be to engage purely with the ethical content of 
cosmopolitan norms, while ignoring their genealogy and the socio-historical conditions of 
their production. Even a brief consideration of the history of the idea of cosmopolitanism in 
Western thought reveals its deep implication in the conception and practice of empire and 
capitalism. Anthony Pagden has argued persuasively that European ideas of cosmopolitanism 
emerged in tandem with the spread of European empires: ‗just as Cicero was writing as the 
Roman republic was being replaced by the Roman Empire, so Zeno was writing at the very 
moment that the independent Greek city states were being absorbed into Alexander‘s ‗world‘ 
empire…one of the greatest of the Roman Stoics [Marcus Aurelius] was also an emperor, 
and…Seneca wrote for Nero.‘
17
 Similarly, he writes that it was European Enlightenment 
cosmopolitans who often advanced moral justifications for later exercises in European 
imperialism.
18
 Stoic, Cynic and Enlightenment cosmopolitanisms may have emerged in 
tandem with the spread of empires, partly because the ideas of universal moral community 
that they recommended seemed practicable at precisely those times and in those places where 
universal political communities (i.e. empires) were being constructed, and partly also because 
those ideas provided attractive justifications for projects of empire-building. 
One might also regard cosmopolitanism as being implicated in the spread of a capitalist world 
market. There is a distinct view in early Enlightenment thinking, evident in the work of 
figures such as Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel, which sees the cultivation of cosmopolitan 
sentiments of universal love for humanity as being motivated by primarily egoistic 
considerations. In this admittedly contested view, human beings‘ desire for survival (but also 
their greed for superfluities) necessitates trade and commerce, which in turn demands the 
cultivation of universal sociability. Commerce is seen to play a civilising role in international 
relations, with the result that the promotion of trade and commerce becomes both rational and 
a matter of moral duty.
19
 Because trade is enabled by the institution of private property, the 
moral imperative to promote trade is in effect one to impose property rights—by force if 
necessary—on those parts of the world that do not yet recognise them. The language of 
individual liberal rights and duties are ultimately an expression of this effort to reorganise 
human relations as market relations. Universal community in this view is not an end in itself, 
but a means to the end of business, with cosmopolitan sociability functioning as the 
ideological superstructure of a world capitalist market.
20
 Little wonder, then, that critics have 
noted that ideas of world citizenship have been championed by, or at least come most readily 
to, elites who are able to experience a sense of inhabitation of the world as a whole thanks to 
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their ability to travel and transact across borders, armed with visa-friendly passports, credit 
cards and invitations to seminars such as this one.
21
 In short, the cosmopolitan gaze has 
historically been that of the powerful and wealthy.  
The upshot of the argument so far would appear to be that although the praxis of 
cosmopolitanism by elites would be good for subalterns, subalterns themselves could never 
be cosmopolitans. Nor would they want to be. While the material self-sufficiency of elite 
cosmopolitan theorists confirms them in their individualism and enables them to recommend 
the repudiation of particularistic attachments such as ethnic solidarities, such attachments are 
often a resource for effective collective action and mutual support among the less powerful.
22
 
Put differently, if inclusion in the polis has usually had to be fought for, the subaltern as 
individual would appear to stand little chance in that fight. Subaltern inclusion seems more 
likely as a result of the strengthening of collective consciousness and subaltern community.
23
 
Historically, perhaps it is communitarianism—and more particularly, nationalism—which has 
been seen as the ‗natural‘ vocabulary of grievance and resistance (one thinks here of Isaiah 
Berlin‘s view of nationalism as ‗a response to a wound inflicted upon a society‘
24
). 
Compelling as they may seem, these conclusions would be too hasty and simple. Perhaps it is 
atomistic individualism, rather than cosmopolitanism per se, which is inimical to effective 
subaltern agency.
25
 As efforts to forge new forms of community across national lines, 
working class and feminist internationalisms might be seen as attempts to articulate subaltern 
cosmopolitanisms. Marx and Engels‘ famous declaration that ‗the working men have no 
country‘,
26
 echoed by Virginia Woolf in respect of women,
27
 might be regarded as 
exhortations to cosmopolitan resistance addressed to subalterns.  
As for the political economy of the cosmopolitan gaze, there is a great deal to be said for the 
possibility of subaltern access to cosmopolitan scripts. In an argument that essentially adapts 
Benedict Anderson‘s classic account of the origins of nationalism
28
 to the conditions of a 
globalising world, Arjun Appadurai has suggested that we are beginning to witness the 
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emergence of ‗postnational‘ communities. Just as New World nations were imagined in 
particular ways corresponding to the migratory and professional mobility options of creole 
elites conjoined with the phenomenon of ‗print capitalism‘, global migration and global mass 
media now provide the infrastructural basis for the imagination of postnational 
communities.
29
 Importantly, in Appadurai‘s view, migration is not the prerogative of the 
privileged: the demographic basis for a postnational world is provided as much by refugees, 
exiles, migrant labour,
30
 trafficked women and illegal aliens, as by wealthy frequent flyers. 
One might still object that the link between cosmopolitanism and mobility (even subaltern 
mobility) leaves serious questions about the possibilities of cosmopolitan identification for 
the subaltern immobile.
31
 Yet even if labour flows are policed ever more stringently by 
nation-states, flows of capital and information on their own might be seen as foisting a sort of 
‗forced cosmopolitanism‘ even on rooted subalterns, albeit unevenly. If anyone can live in 
locales entirely of their own creation, it is the powerful; the weak find it harder to resist the 
encroachment of external influences and the consequent cosmopolitanisation of their lives. 
We might say, then, that hybridity emerges first on the terrain of the weak.
32
 
What I have been trying to do in the foregoing paragraphs is to unsettle any easy association 
of either cosmopolitanism or nationalism with elitism or subalternity. Insofar as the literature 
of international normative theory seeks to concretise these associations, it provides a partial 
and potentially misleading account of the emancipatory potentials of these normative optics. 
In the following section, I present—in a highly unequal fashion that reflects the current state 
of my knowledge, rather than a ranking of their importance—the views of four postcolonial 
thinkers who refused the easy opposition between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. All four 
were fierce critics of nationalism, even as they fervently desired the success of nationalist 
movements of their time and place. They advocated cosmopolitan sensibilities, while 
remaining unwilling to completely repudiate nationalism. These thinkers are important for 
my purposes in this paper, not only because they embody a tension between cosmopolitanism 
and nationalism that is inadequately reflected in the literature,
33
 but also because they are 
engaged in the task of thinking through the potentials of cosmopolitanism and nationalism 
from the perspective of nations struggling for independence and still marginal to the 
community of states that constitute the world of international relations. The thinkers 
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themselves are hardly marginal; all four are extremely well known though perhaps somewhat 
ghettoised in the academy, locked up in fields such as comparative literature and postcolonial 
studies. As such, I make no claim to undertaking subaltern normative theory, though all four 
might be seen as reflecting on the condition of marginality. Finally, my criticism of 
Eurocentrism in the literature notwithstanding, none of these thinkers can be described as 
‗non-Western‘ in any easy fashion, given their intellectual influences, their professional 
locations in some cases, and the highly cosmopolitan itineraries of their lives. 
Joyce / Tagore / Said / Fanon 
There is a celebrated passage in James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, in 
which Stephen Dedalus confounds his friend Davin with his refusal to sign a socialist petition 
advocating universal peace and disarmament and his insistent mockery of Irish nationalism. 
‗I can‘t understand you‘, says a perplexed Davin. ‗One time I hear you talk against English 
literature. Now you talk against the Irish informers. What with your name and your 
ideas…Are you Irish at all?‘ Dedalus‘s response to this provocation reveals a deep bitterness 
about Irish nationalism: its expectation of sacrifice from its people despite a history of Irish 
collaboration with the invading English, its betrayal of its most loyal sons, and most crucially 
its suppression of individuality (‗When the soul of a man is born in this country there are nets 
flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall 
try to fly by those nets.‘) Yet the invective hurled against Ireland in this passage (‗Ireland is 
the old sow that eats her farrow‘), does not ultimately amount to a disavowal of belonging 
(‗this race and this country and this life produced me…I shall express myself as I am‘).
34
 
Joyce scholar Kevin Barry locates Joyce in a group of cultural renegades including John 
Eglinton, Thomas Kettle, James Connolly, Thomas McDonagh, R. W. Lynd and the 
contributors to a short-lived Irish literary journal called Dana. These critics broadly opposed 
the notion that cultural nativism was the most effective means by which Ireland might oppose 
British cultural dominance, insisting on a broadening of the literary revival beyond national 
boundaries, the recognition of difference within Irish life, and an insistence on cultural 
criticism. Yet in contrast to most other contributors to Dana, who espoused a straightforward 
modernism intent on dispending with tradition, Barry characterises Joyce as a ‗perverse 
traditionalist‘ whose writings remain immersed in the methods and themes of the past, neither 
revering them nor eliminating their complexity. As he puts it, ‗sporting with the past, abusing 
it, always implicated in it, [Joyce‘s writings] refuse to jettison history while they release the 
present from its grip.‘
35
  
This attitude towards history is evident in Joyce‘s commentary on Irish politics, of which a 
series of articles written in Trieste between 1907 and 1912 are an important collection. Here, 
the refusal of cultural nativism seems to come precisely out of a deep awareness of Irish 
history, not least the ironic fact that a great many of the leading figures of Irish nationalism 
were not of Irish descent at all. Joyce frequently deconstructs the very notion of an Irish 
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essence, as for example in the following passage, which is also revealing of his view of 
nationalism:   
Our civilisation is an immense woven fabric in which very different elements are mixed, 
in which Nordic rapacity is reconciled to Roman law, and new Bourgeois conventions to 
the remains of a Siriac religion. In such a fabric, it is pointless searching for a thread that 
has remained pure, virgin and uninfluenced by other threads nearby. What race or 
language…can nowadays claim to be pure? No race has less right to make such a boast 
than the one presently inhabiting Ireland. Nationality (if this is not really a useful fiction 
like many others which the scalpels of the present-day scientists have put paid to) must 
find its basic reason for being in something that surpasses, that transcends and that 
informs changeable entities such as blood or human speech.
36
  
Even as he insists that nationalism cannot be constructed on something as fluid and 
indeterminate as race or language, Joyce leaves tantalisingly open in this passage the 
possibility that a raison d‘etre for nationalism can be found. While recognising that this 
reason inheres in the role that nationalism claims to play in liberation from the tyranny of 
imperialism, Joyce‘s insistence on ‗something that surpasses, that transcends‘ the immediacy 
of the preoccupations of Irish nationalists means that to be justifiable, nationalism must be 
directed against all forms of tyranny. As he puts it, ‗I do not see what good it does to 




In the same year (1916) that Portrait was first published in book form, another literary 
modernist in another British colony published a novel called Ghare Baire (translated into 
English as The Home and the World), which expressed a similar refusal of imperialism and 
authoritarian nationalism. In language that virtually echoes Dedalus‘s determination to fly by 
the nets of nationality, language and religion, the autobiographical protagonist of this other 
novel, written by the Indian Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore, speaks of the need to 
‗save the country from the thousand-and-one-snares—of religion, custom and selfishness‘, 
which nationalist agitators were laying amongst the people.
38
 Although there is no evidence 
that Joyce and Tagore were influenced by each other‘s work, it is no coincide that two 
novelists from Ireland and India crafted these fictional kindred spirits contemporaneously, 
given their location in comparable discursive fields. Early 20
th
 century Ireland and Bengal 
were in some ways remarkably similar places, characterised by a comparable mixture of 
distinct modes of anti-colonial protest: constitutional agitation, cultural nationalism, mass-
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 Bengal, The Home and the World personifies the conflict between 
cosmopolitanism and nationalism as seen from the vantage point of a nation attempting to 
wrest its freedom from imperial rule, in the form of a love triangle involving two men and a 
woman. Most readings of the novel see cosmopolitanism as being personified in the character 
of Nikhil, a wealthy but enlightened zamindar (landlord), whose progressiveness is 
manifested in his views on gender relations, the need for female education, the welfare of his 
poor tenants and, most crucially for the narrative, his views on nationalist agitation. Nikhil is 
a supporter of the goals of the Swadeshi movement (swaraj or self-rule), but critical of its 
methods. In particular, he refuses to use his authority as a zamindar to enforce the nationalist 
injunction against buying British-made goods, knowing full well that the impact of the 
boycott was likely to fall hardest on poorer consumers who tended to purchase cheap 
imported goods in preference to expensive indigenous substitutes.
41
 Nationalism is 
represented by Nikhil‘s friend Sandip, who shares none of the former‘s reticence as far as the 
ethics of mobilisation are concerned. Passionately committed to the success of the Swadeshi 
movement, Sandip unapologetically uses Hindu religious symbolism in an effort to 
primordialise the nationalist identity he seeks to construct. When this alienates the Muslim 
minority, who also bear the commercial brunt of the boycott in their capacity as petty traders 
reliant on the sale of foreign cloth, he ruthlessly urges his followers to bring them into line. 
The female character, Bimala, who is married to Nikhil, occupies a pivotal position in the 
novel as the personification of Bengal,
42
 torn between the values espoused by the two men. 
She is the terrain on which the two men duel, the prize for whose affection they compete, but 
also the arbiter of the novel—her modulating feelings towards the male characters are a 
metaphor for public perceptions of the political efficacy of their competing worldviews. 
Bimala becomes increasingly enamoured with Sandip‘s fiery rhetoric, which seems to offer a 
more potent form of political agency able to deliver the nation from imperialist subjugation. 
Conversely, she becomes intellectually and sexually estranged from Nikhil, whose less heroic 
social work, geared towards long-term societal transformation and carried out in almost 
complete obliviousness of the British presence, seems less promising. Yet Bimala is 
increasingly assailed by doubt. Sandip has persuaded her to steal money from her husband‘s 
safe for the nationalist cause—an act that she regrets almost immediately as it begins to 
vitiate her relationships with members of her own household. In the world outside, the 
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pernicious consequences of Sandip‘s political activism are beginning to unfold. When 
Swadeshi activists begin to punish those found contravening the boycott, tensions are 
inflamed and the Muslims riot in protest. But Bimala‘s second thoughts come too late to save 
her relationship with Nikhil, who is wounded—possibly fatally
43
—in the course of trying to 
quell a communal riot.  
Bimala‘s remorse at the end of the novel is usually read as a vindication of Nikhil‘s position, 
shot through with the deeply pessimistic sentiment that Sandip‘s views are more politically 
resonant in the world. Martha Nussbaum, for example, has read the book as the ‗tragic story 
of the defeat of a reasonable and principled cosmopolitanism by the forces of nationalism and 
ethnocentrism.‘
44
 This is, in my view, too simple a reading, particularly given the broader 
context of her article, which appears to set up an oppositional relationship between patriotism 
and cosmopolitanism. Nikhil straddles both, his patriotism being expressed metaphorically in 
his unflagging devoting to Bimala even in moments of frustration, misunderstanding and 
betrayal, but also more literally in his endorsement of the goals of Swadeshi, in his 
(admittedly disillusioned) financial support for Sandip,
45
 and in his unceasing efforts to 
redefine rather than cede the patriotic space.
46
 The novel is therefore more plausibly read as a 
conflict between two forms of patriotism, as suggested by Ashis Nandy—one that is 
unreasoned, authoritarian and demagogic, and another that is critical, reflective and 
uncoerced.
47
 But Nandy‘s reading, like Nussbaum‘s, remains too one-sided in its persistence 
in seeing the novel as essentially a critique of the politics of Sandip. 
I would argue that The Home and the World is also a critique of Nikhil and his politics of 
cosmopolitanism. Indeed, in having both male protagonists exist the scene towards the end of 
the novel, Tagore repudiates both cosmopolitanism and nationalism, leaving Bimala alone to 
reconsider the future trajectory of her self-assertion. In silencing both the main characters at 
the end, Tagore was recommending neither of them. In a highly persuasive reading, Michael 
Sprinker has suggested that Nikhil is not merely ineffectual but also deeply paternalistic in 
his insistence on bestowing his conception of freedom on others.
48
 This is most obvious in his 
attempts to educate, modernise and ‗civilise‘ Bimala, something that Nikhil acknowledges in 
a moment of self-flagellating introspection about the causes of their estrangement.
49
 There is 
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no corresponding critique in the novel of the conservatism of Nikhil‘s politics of rescue-
from-above insofar as this operates across class lines. In a crucial sub-plot in the narrative, 
clearly intended to draw out his character, Nikhil permits a poor tenant who has been evicted 
by a nationalist zamindar as punishment for contravening the Swadeshi boycott, to live on his 
land. This episode contrasts the bad zamindar with the good zamindar (Nikhil), but zamindari 
per se does not come under attack.  
Nonetheless, even Tagore‘s limited critique of Nikhil suggests that The Home and the World 
is as much a criticism of the benevolent pretensions of imperialism and universalist 
modernisation, as it is of nationalism. This alternative reading is borne out by Tagore‘s more 
didactic pronouncements on cosmopolitanism and nationalism, in which he distanced himself 
from both polarities. In an essay on nationalism published a year after The Home and the 
World, he declared that ‗neither the colourless vagueness of cosmopolitanism, nor the fierce 
self-idolatory of nation-worship, is the goal of human history.‘
50
 Elsewhere, he concludes a 
reflection on identity politics in education with the hope that ‗the institutions we are setting 
up today express both our national and our cosmopolitan consciousness.‘
51
 But what did this 
mean? 
Tagore‘s antipathy towards nationalism is clearly and forcefully expressed in a number of 
writings; his criticisms of cosmopolitanism are more subtle, implicit and easily missed. It is 
possible that he felt a greater imperative to direct his critical energies against nationalism, 
given that it was the hegemonic discourse of his time. Yet despite this critique of nationalism, 
it was evident from his political anti-imperialism and his unparalleled contribution to the 
culture of Bengal that he was working towards many of the same goals as the nationalists. 
Tagore attitude towards nationalism was shaped by his encounter with the Swadeshi 
movement, of which he was initially a leading personality
52
 but later a severe critic. The 
decisive factor seems to have been his growing awareness of the extent to which the 
movement relied on coercion for its effectiveness. Such coercion typically took the form of 
destruction of property, physical intimidation and assault, social ostracism or the use of caste-
sanctions against those found violating the nationalist injunction against patronising foreign 
goods or institutions.
53
 The result was a serious alienation of subaltern groups such as 
Muslims and lower-caste Namasudra peasants, and the eventual eruption of Hindu-Muslim 
riots in East Bengal in 1906-07, all of which were fictionalised in the violent denouement of 
The Home and the World. This early awareness of the subaltern experience of nationalism 
later developed into a more profound critique, expressed in a series of lectures on the subject 
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delivered in Japan and the United States in 1916-17. Here, Tagore criticises nationalism as a 
powerful mass delusion, under the influence of which ‗the whole people can carry out its 
systematic programme of the most virulent self-seeking without being in the least aware of its 
moral perversion.‘
54
 He accuses nationalism of fostering ill-will between nations on account 
of its triumphalist exceptionalism, and of curtailing individual freedom within nations. There 
is even an eloquent critique of international society for demanding that political subjectivity 




These criticisms of nationalism recur in a series of highly public disagreements with Gandhi, 
which offer a striking contrast between Tagore the rationalist modernist committed to the 
slow and painstaking transformation of social attitudes, and Gandhi the master tactician given 
to exploiting existing prejudices and popular beliefs insofar as these assisted in the enterprise 
of nationalist mobilisation.
56
 Thus, Tagore was horrified by Gandhi‘s characterisation of the 
1934 Bihar earthquake as divine retribution for the practice of untouchability (even though he 
shared Gandhi‘s goal of eradicating that egregious social practice). He disagreed with 
Gandhi‘s attempt to persuade people to boycott and burn foreign cloth by describing it as 
‗impure‘. And he was irritated by Gandhi‘s exhortation to his followers to set aside a few 
hours every day to spin khadi on a charkha—an activity that Gandhi viewed as a collective 
egalitarian project symbolising the dignity of labour, but that Tagore saw as promoting a 
mind-numbing uniformity that crushed individual creativity and rebellion. 
Tagore was well-positioned to critique Gandhian hegemony because his anti-imperialism 
could never, credibly, be doubted. There were several key moments, particularly before 
Gandhi‘s assumption of the leadership of the national moment, at which his voice led the 
anti-imperialist chorus. One thinks here particularly of his resignation of his knighthood 
following the Jallianwala Bagh massacre of 1919, an event that he described at the time as 
being ‗without parallel in the history of civilised governments.‘
57
 Nonetheless, his criticisms 
of nationalism tended to be ignored by his compatriots, perhaps on account of his failure to 
articulate alternatives to the political structures that he was criticising. At times it seemed as 
if he was not very interested in politics at all, with education and social reform being of much 
higher priority.
58
 Far from constituting a retreat from politics, this attitude stemmed from a 
particular understanding of imperialism, not as the cause of India‘s ailments, but as 
symptomatic of pre-existing social evils such as casteism and the rigid adherence to 
anachronistic traditions, which fragmented the body politic. Without serious attention to these 
social weaknesses, he believed that independence from Britain would simply leave India 
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vulnerable to other predators.
59
 Tagore viewed politics as a sort of superstructural realm 
resting on a social base.
60
 The emphasis on education and social reform was his way of 
building the social foundations of a more emancipatory political system. 
It is therefore to his writings on culture, rather than politics, that we must turn to observe the 
tension between cosmopolitanism and nationalism articulated most clearly. It is impossible in 
the course of a brief essay like this one to do justice to Tagore‘s unparalleled contribution in 
the form of novels, short stories, plays, essays, songs, poems and paintings to the Bengali 
literary and artistic canon. His commitment to the revival of the Bengali language was 
accompanied by a strong emphasis on vernacular education and the occasionally expressed 
worry that the excessive use of English would lead Indians to turn exclusively towards the 
West for inspiration.
61
 This did not quite make Tagore a cultural nationalist. It was more his 
way of preparing the ground for an egalitarian interaction of cultures.  
Tagore was passionately committed to enabling the interaction of cultures of the East and 
West, both from a normative conviction that universal Truths could only be revealed through 
the comparative study of diverse cultures,
62
 and from a historical appreciation of the 
inescapable hybridity of all cultures including ‗Indian‘ culture.
63
 He welcomed contact with 
British and European cultures as the latest in a long series of external influences that he 
likened to tributaries feeding the stream of Indian thought. He lauded these influences as 
‗providential‘ on account of their revitalising effect on an Indian culture that had grown 
stagnant and unreflective, insisting that India had much to learn from Europe not only in 
material but also in moral and cultural respects.
64
 
Yet he was keen that such interaction take place in an egalitarian fashion and painfully aware 
that this was not yet the case.
65
 His argument for cultural cosmopolitanism is therefore 
qualified in the following way, in an essay setting out his views on education: 
…before we are in a position to face other world cultures, or cooperate with them, we 
must build up our own by the synthesis of the diverse elements that have come to India. 
When we take our stand at such a centre and turn towards the West, our gaze shall no 
longer be timid and dazed, our heads shall remain erect. For, we shall then be able to look 
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Elsewhere, he writes that ‗when we have the intellectual capital of our own, the commerce of 
thought with the outer world becomes natural and fully profitable‘; but adds almost in the 
same breath that ‗to say that such commerce is inherently wrong, is to encourage the worst 
form of provincialism, productive of nothing but intellectual indigence.‘
67
 A similar tension 
between openness and rootedness is encoded in a series of natural metaphors scattered across 
a number of other writings:  
But now we are overtaken by the outside world, our seclusion is lost forever. Yet this we 
must not regret as a plant should never regret when the obscurity of its seed-time is 
broken…we must not, in foolish pride, still keep ourselves fast within the shell of the seed 
and the crust of the earth which protected and nourished our ideals; for these, the shell and 
the crust, were meant to be broken, so that life may spring up in all its vigour and beauty, 
bringing its offerings to the world in open light.
68
 
The butterfly will have to be persuaded that the freedom of the sky is of higher value than 
the shelter of the cocoon.
69
 
The nursery of the infant should be secluded, its cradle safe. But the same seclusion, if 




Tagore is not a cultural protectionist, for he remarks unsentimentally that when the barriers 
separating cultures are broken down, ‗only that will survive which is basically consistent with 
the universal‘, and later, that cultures ‗must pass the test of the world-market, if their 
maximum value is to be obtained.‘
71
 It is clear, though, that he believes seeds, cocoons and 
cradles to be necessary—for a time—to provide the space within which to build the 
intellectual capital that makes intercultural exchange mutually profitable. If these are seen as 
metaphors for nationalist identity-consolidation, then we might read Tagore as making a case 
for nationalism as a necessary, but necessarily temporary stage, through which subaltern 
cultures must pass before they could interact on equal terms with other cultures on the world 
stage.
72
   
The tension between cosmopolitanism and nationalism in resistance is more explicitly 
addressed in the work of Edward Said, whose oeuvre—taken as a whole—offers an 
opportunity to think about the distinct political ends to which these normative worldviews 
might be deployed. On the one hand, Said is the author of a number of works which 
exemplify a cosmopolitan scepticism of stable, essentialised identities. Thus, Orientalism 
might be read as a critique of a Western tendency to construct the ‗Orient‘ in a singular and 
undifferentiated fashion as an underdeveloped space, given to sensuality and despotism, and 
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in all respects inferior to a ‗West‘ that was rational, developed and humane. Although the 
book has been accused of a sort of reverse-essentialisation on account of its reductionist 
reading of what was in fact a more complicated set of Western representational practices,
73
 
Said defended it as ‗explicitly anti-essentialist, radically sceptical about all categorical 
designations such as Orient and Occident.‘
74
 Likewise Culture and Imperialism, in tracing the 
links between metropolitan cultural texts and the imperial periphery, reveals a number of 
iconic works of the Western canon to be hybrid and radically impure.
75
 We are reminded that 
it is Australian wealth that makes possible the Great Expectations that Pip entertains, that the 
order and civility of Jane Austen‘s Mansfield Park is premised on the profits generated by 
slave plantations in Antigua, that it is impossible to make sense of Verdi‘s Aida without 
reference to the politics of its commissioning by the Khedive of Egypt who saw this as an 
integral element of his effort to gain admission into international society. As a literary and 
cultural critic, Said insists that essentialised identities are mythical abstractions, even lies: 
‗cultures are too intermingled, their contents and histories too interdependent and hybrid, for 
surgical separation into large and mostly ideological oppositions like Orient and Occident.‘
76
 
Yet as a prominent spokesman for Palestinian self-determination, Said has been described as 
‗an active and important producer of the evolving Palestinian identity.‘
77
 In his considerable 
writing on the Palestinian experience of dispossession and resistance, Said speaks insistently 
of a Palestinian identity, nestled within a larger Arab identity, but distinct and discrete from 
Jordanian, Lebanese, Syrian and other national identities in the region.
78
 In these writings, we 
are no longer reminded of the fluidity of identity, of mixing, hybridity and impurity. It is 
almost as if the nationalist Said must deploy the very techniques of identity essentialisation 
that the cosmopolitan Said has savaged. 
Benita Parry describes this tension as one between a ‗cognitive recognition of cultural 
heterogeneity and the political need for solidarity.‘ Said recognises the subject as decentred 
and culture as hybrid, but also acknowledges the potential of imaginary collectivities 
constructed under conditions of subjugation to confront and perhaps overcome those 
conditions.
79
 This is correct, although I am not sure that Said experiences these tensions in 
separate realms—the cognitive and the political—as if Said the literary critic could afford to 
acknowledge the messiness and hybridity of identity, while Said the political activist must 
insist on stability, solidity and solidarity. Even within the realm of the political, Said believed 
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that political exigencies of different sorts pulled in both directions, demanding both split and 
united selves. 
We can see this clearly in Said‘s view of nationalism as something that is both necessary and 
unfortunate. Nationalism is necessary, particularly ‗for those of us just emerging from 
marginality and persecution‘ as a means of reclaiming identities that have long been denied or 
suppressed.
80
 Yet Said relentlessly criticises nationalism for its tendency to engender a 
politics of hierarchy and supremacism, for its reliance on myth-making and indoctrination and 
its laundering of the cultural past, and for its dangerous malleability in the hands of states, 
which are prone to abusing it as an ideology to legitimate various sorts of oppressions.
81
 How 
does Said reconcile his conviction in the indispensability of nationalism to subaltern struggle, 
with his equally acute recognition of its oppressiveness?  
In his most pessimistic moments, Said views this dilemma as a tragedy incapable of 
resolution.
82
 In more optimistic moments, he appears to believe that the worst excesses of 
nationalism might be mitigated through a kind of methodological transparency and self-
awareness. In this vein he writes that ‗with regard to the consensus on group or national 
identity it is the intellectual‘s task to show how the group is a constructed, manufactured, 
even in some cases invented object, with a history of struggle and conquest behind it, that it is 
sometimes important to represent.‘
83
 Yet if successful nationalism requires the naturalisation 
and primordialisation of identity, or ‗forgetting‘ as Renan put it more bluntly,
84
 it is not clear 
how the intellectual can draw attention to the invented nature of identity without being 
subversive of the nationalist project itself. 
Said achieves greater clarity on the need for, but also the pitfalls of, nationalism, when he 
turns to Frantz Fanon, the foremost theorist of the Algerian revolution. Fanon‘s classic 
statement of resistance is concerned as much with independence from colonial oppression, as 
with liberation from a nationalist bourgeoisie that perpetuates the poverty and misery of 
subaltern classes. Resistance, for Fanon, is a bifocal enterprise in which the people must pass 
‗from total, undiscriminating nationalism to social and economic awareness.‘
85
 Without such 
a transition from nationalist to a humanist socio-economic consciousness, he argues, the 
oppressive nationalist bourgeoisie remains entrenched. Its dependence on the metropolitan 
bourgeoisie makes it both too weak to play the historic role of a true bourgeoisie (i.e. to 
generate the conditions conducive to the formation of an industrial proletariat), but also too 
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strong to be easily dislodged. As a result, the postcolonial economy continues to be 
characterised by quasi-feudal productive relations and is consigned to a permanently 
peripheral position in the world system. Domestically, the revolutionary leader becomes ‗a 
screen between the people and the rapacious bourgeoisie‘, using moral and political capital 
accrued from his leadership of the liberation struggle to obviate challenges from below; the 
revolutionary party ossifies into an instrument of control and pacification. In such 
circumstances, a people who remain trapped within a nationalist mindset lack the necessary 
consciousness with which they might challenge their own bourgeoisie. 
Fanon appears to present the nationalist struggle against the colonial occupier and the 
cosmopolitan struggle against the nationalist elite as sequential stages, although there is room 
for debate on this point.
86
 A recent biography reports that although he was extremely critical 
in private of elements of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) elite—particularly figures 
such as Boussouf and Bentobbal on account of their failure to envisage anything for Algeria 
beyond independence—he remained a loyal and disciplined militant of the organisation in his 
public statements and writings, reluctant to distance himself from these men before the 
Algerian struggle had been won.
87
 Said, however, reads Fanon as arguing that the two 
dimensions of the bifocal struggle must be contemporaneous, so that ‗loyalty to the group‘s 
fight for survival cannot draw in the intellectual so far as to narcotise the critical sense, or 
reduce its imperatives, which are always to go beyond survival to questions of political 
liberation, to critiques of the leadership, to presenting alternatives that are too often 
marginalised or pushed aside as irrelevant to the main battle at hand.‘
88
 Said‘s harsh attacks 
on the Palestinian Authority (PA) for its authoritarianism, corruption and alleged 
incompetence in agreeing to a ‗peace process‘ that perpetuated the Israeli occupation, 
alongside his continuing criticism of Israel and the international community, were a measure 
of how seriously he took this imperative to struggle simultaneously on two fronts.
89
 
The question of whether such struggle is better pursued sequentially or simultaneously is a 
legitimate one. The argument for sequentiality is largely a pragmatic one: there may be little 
prospect of liberation from a bourgeoisie of any sort without independence from a colonial 
occupier. Yet proponents of simultaneity would argue that the postcolonial struggle for 
liberation is made more difficult by the hegemony acquired by a revolutionary leadership 
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during the anticolonial struggle. That hegemony must therefore be contested during the 
struggle itself, if the liberation is not to be owned by its elite leadership. In the context of 
Palestine, however, the debate over the sequentiality or simultaneity of independence and 
liberation is perhaps rendered moot by the fact that Said‘s major criticism of the Oslo Accords 
concerned the very incompleteness of the ‗independence‘ from Israel that they heralded. The 
Accords, as he saw them, enabled Israel to defer negotiations on virtually all the difficult 
questions surrounding Palestinian statehood (borders, refugees, Jerusalem, settlements), 
perpetuating its hold over the Occupied Territories whilst absolving it of responsibility for the 
living conditions of Palestinians. Conversely the Accords gave the PA enough sovereignty to 
enable it to exercise coercive authority over its people, who were thereby robbed of the 
prospect of either independence or liberation.
90
 
We might see in Said‘s late advocacy of a bi-national one-state solution to the Israel/Palestine 
conflict, a final attempt at reconciliation of his cosmopolitan and nationalist commitments.
91
 
Yet it is crucial to recognise that even the one-state solution does not dispense with the need 
for nationalist consciousness. For although the demand here is not for a separate state, it may 
still take a nationalist struggle to win recognition and equal protection before the law for a 
long-denied and suppressed national identity within the framework of a single state. 
Beyond nationalism-as-transitory-stage 
The thinkers studied in the preceding section are interesting for the purposes of this paper 
because they refuse the oft-reiterated opposition between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, 
but more particularly because they are concerned with the emancipatory potentials of both 
from the perspective of subalternity. They defend nationalism as a necessary means of 
gathering together subaltern energies with a view to constructing the agency with which 
conditions of subjugation might be combated. But they insist that only a cosmopolitan 
humanist consciousness can provide critical perspective on the oppressions immanent in the 
process of resistance, which itself generates winners and losers. There is an acute sensitivity 
in the moment in which they are writing, to impediments to self-determination emanating 
from both within and outside the political communities they are helping to construct. In this 
respect, the thinkers surveyed here evince a more complicated awareness of threat and a more 
nuanced attitude towards boundaries than is evident in some contemporary normative theory.  
Attitudes towards boundaries in the debate between cosmopolitans and nationalists are often 
premised, at least implicitly, on assumptions about the locus of threats to freedom and self-
determination. The debate might therefore be seen as a conversation about the relationship 
between space, threat and boundaries. A number of contemporary contributors to this debate 
adopt astonishingly simplistic assumptions about the locus of threat, which in turn inform 
their attitudes towards boundaries. Thus, many liberal cosmopolitans are keen to minimise the 
importance of boundaries precisely because they see the postcolonial state as the primary 
locus of threat to human rights. In Charles Beitz‘s view, to give just one example, ‗the role of 
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human rights in international political discourse has two aspects: first, human rights may 
serve to justify interference in the internal affairs of states or other local communities; second, 
they may argue for various external agents, such as international organisations and other 
states, to commit the resources required for effective interference.‘
92
 Missing from this 
analysis is any acknowledgement that human rights might be threatened by global structures 
or actors external to the state. As Anne Orford has demonstrated compellingly, contemporary 
narratives of intervention are informed by a spatial allocation of culpability in which problems 
are represented as arising from local dynamics internal to the putatively dysfunctional states 
that are the objects of intervention, while the ‗international‘ is read as a sanitised space 
populated by heroic actors ready to rescue people from crises that are seen entirely as 
creatures of postcoloniality.
93
 Conversely, communitarian voices—emanating both from 
within the academy
94
 and the ranks of postcolonial elites—have tended to valorise state 
sovereignty by exaggerating the risk of neo-colonial predation by external actors and 
obscuring the culpability of postcolonial states in impeding the meaningful exercise of self-
determination by their societies. One thinks here of the frequent use of anti-imperialism by 
postcolonial elites as a rhetorical shield behind which to bludgeon domestic opponents into 
submission.
95
 Recognising that subaltern agency may be threatened both from sources 
external to the political community and from the community itself, the thinkers surveyed in 
this paper seem to inhabit a space between cosmopolitanism and nationalism, in which 
boundaries are believed to be necessary but contingent on their performance, and in which 
community is seen both as a potential source of repression and refuge.  
Yet their positions raise a crucial question, on which I offer some brief and tentative thoughts 
here in conclusion. Each of the figures studied here appears to see nationalism as a transitory 
stage through which subaltern resistance must pass, but which upon achieving its goal of 
recognition of equal worth must subsume itself in universality. But is the work of nationalism 
really completed with the achievement of sovereign statehood? This is another way of asking 
whether the sensibility that these thinkers sought to articulate is appropriate only to the 
moment of emergence of insurgent nations into international society, or offers a more 
enduring way of thinking about boundaries and identity. 
Subaltern studies scholars have shown us that while subaltern energies were successfully 
harnessed by nationalist elites during the national struggle, subaltern subjects remained 
essentially estranged from the mentalities and apparatus of the modern nation-state. Yet their 
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relationship with the international continues to be mediated by the state, and more particularly 
by the relationships that their elites have with the international. In states where elites have an 
antagonistic relationship with the international system (one thinks here of those deemed 
‗rogue‘ states by the powerful), the situation sometimes mimics the colonial encounter in 
which an external civilising authority confronts an internal nativist opposition. The thinkers 
studied here speak most obviously and relevantly to these sorts of circumstances. But the 
articulation of cosmopolitanism and nationalism may also be relevant to subaltern resistance 
in circumstances where elites enjoy a relationship of complicity with, or dependence on, 
external actors. 
To think this through, let us shift the focus of analysis from the moment of emergence to a 
moment of postcolonial crisis in which the very viability of the nation-state as a political 
community is at stake in conditions of contemporary capitalism. It has been suggested that, 
far from withering away as a result of the operation of neoliberal capital, the postcolonial state 
has been ‗transnationalised‘.
96
 This is a condition in which key elements of the state develop 
close linkages with external actors, either under pressure from self-interested local elites, or 
because the state has become beholden to those external actors for its survival in moments of 
extreme vulnerability such as crushing debt. In such circumstances, the state‘s need for, and 
responsibilities to, global capital, begin to take precedence over its obligations to meet the 
socio-economic needs of its subaltern classes. A small but significant section of the anti-
capitalist movement regards the state as irredeemably mortgaged to capital and therefore 
writes it out of the utopias it seeks to construct.
97
 But others such as Samir Amin have argued 
that transnationalised states might yet be ‗renationalised‘ via popular nationalist movements 
in the periphery. These would be nationalisms of a very particular kind: not nationalisms for 
new states and distinct from the official nationalist discourses wielded by states, but perhaps 
better seen as ‗nationalisms against the state‘
98
 intended to democratise unrepresentative 
states. Amin continues to believe that only a universalist social and political consciousness 
can regulate the global economy, but this is a socialist cosmopolitanism that relies on the 
success of popular peripheral nationalisms.
99
 Insofar as popular nationalisms can perform this 
democratising role, rather than being relegated to a transitory adolescent phase, nationalism 
should perhaps be seen as a recurring and potentially renewing discourse that has the capacity 
to repair the unmooring of the state and nation, and might be allied to larger projects of global 
redistribution. 
To suggest that such articulations of nationalism and cosmopolitanism are already embodied 
in particular agents is always a risky business. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to find subaltern 
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social movements that appear to be engaged, on the one hand, in a kind of ‗nationalism 
against the state‘ by raising the spectre of neo-colonial invasion, resuscitating the old heroes 
and forgotten ideals of arrested national revolutions and accusing the postcolonial state of 
having betrayed the historic promises on the basis of which it came into existence. 
Simultaneously, such movements also tend to frame their grievances in global, cosmopolitan 
terms, sometimes with the instrumental purpose of obtaining external allies who might 
pressure their otherwise hostile or unresponsive states from the outside, or with a view to 
transferring protest to an international arena when domestic spaces for contention have been 
blocked.
100
 Whether such discourses of global framing amount to a robust normative 
cosmopolitanism, or are instrumentally deployed simply with an eye to consumption by 
powerful and potentially useful audiences, is a critical but contextual question to which no 
generalised answer can be given here.  
The point I am trying to make is that the continued articulation of cosmopolitanism and 
nationalism as vocabularies of resistance in conjunction with one another—rather than in the 
oppositional fashion presented in the normative theory literature—underscores the enduring 
relevance of the sensibilities articulated by the postcolonial theorists studied here, beyond the 
temporal contexts in which they were writing. It does, however, call into question their view 
of nationalism as a discourse whose work would be accomplished with the achievement of 
sovereign statehood. Ultimately, I am denying both a dialectical resolution and a magical 
subsumption of one into the other. Instead, I suggest that both cosmopolitanism and 
nationalism might perform valuable ethico-political work in subaltern resistance; yet either 
unalloyed by the other offers a rather simplistic view of the relationship between space, threat 
and boundaries. Normative theory that does not hold both in tension seems to fail the needs of 
our non-ideal world. 
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